TE2017
  • Introduction
  • January
    • Selection year
    • There is flattery in friendship
    • A greener grid
    • Bullet trains are reshaping China’s economy. Will even more of them help?
    • Hunting white elephants
    • Once upon a crime
    • Squeezed to life
    • Making China great again
    • Bull in a China shop
    • The giant’s client
    • The new Davos man
    • Deep blue ambition
    • Dangling forbidden pleasures
    • One country, two systems
    • Jaw, jaw
    • Own shoal
    • Ending the shame
    • Rooster boosters
    • Rules of engagement
    • Apocalypse now
  • February
    • Call the mayor!
    • Trembling tycoons
    • Waiting to make their move
    • China’s transgender Oprah
    • Blame the critics
    • Getting safer?
    • China’s beleaguered liberals: The two faces of Mr Xi
    • Taiwanese politics: A convenient untruth
    • Intellectual debate: An illiberal dose
    • The stockmarket: Hunting crocodiles
    • Trump toilets: Improperly squatting
    • Asian trade: Bouncing back
    • Inequality in China: The Great Divide of China
    • Shock and ore
    • Journeys to the west
    • The age of the appacus
  • March
    • Lam dunk
    • Choking with fury
    • The constrained dictator
    • Geopolitics: One China, many meanings
    • The one-China policy: The great brawl of China
    • The national legislature: Caretaker of the chrysalis
    • Politics: Any colour, so long as it’s red
    • Dodging censorship: Xi, the traitor
    • Rise of the micro-multinational: Chinese and overseas
    • Nationalism unleashed
    • Code red
    • New rules, new dodges
    • A better pill from China
    • China first
    • Here’s looking at you
    • Clamshell phoneys
    • Buying love
    • Closer to centre-stage
  • April
    • China and America: Tortoise v hare
    • Banyan: Lovin’ Hong Kong
    • Luxury-goods companies are belatedly trying to go digital
    • Averting a Chinese-American trade war
    • Faith and tradition in China: Pilgrims through this barren land
    • An Australia that can say no
    • The loyal family
    • Building a megacity from scratch
    • Jewel in the crown
    • Asia makes, China takes
    • Come closer
    • Macau writ large
    • Robots in the rustbelt
    • Welcome to Silicon Delta
    • The dragon head’s dilemma
    • A China that works
    • Rural education in China: Separate and unequal
    • Education in the countryside: A class apart
    • Education in Hong Kong: Testing times
    • China’s HNA Group goes on a global shopping spree
    • China’s banks: A sunny spell
    • Climate change: No cooling
    • Bicycle sharing: The return of pedal power
    • America and China: Disorder under heaven
    • Pax Americana: An archipelago of empire
    • America in the Pacific: The American lake
    • Pax Sinica: The travails of a regional hegemon
    • Asian neighbours: When elephants fight
    • The risk of conflict: Avoiding the trap
    • China’s internet giants: Three kingdoms, two empires
    • THAAD vibes
    • Stumbling along the last mile
    • Fox and hounds
  • May
    • The new silk route : All aboard the belt-and-road express
    • The new silk route : One belt, one roadblock
    • Chinese investors: The Buffetts of China
    • Shod, but still shoddy
    • A sorry tale
    • In the name of GDP
    • Superannuated
    • The glitter of bronze
    • Hollowed-out hutong
    • Gliding towards the congress
    • App wars
    • Shoals apart
    • A hand up for Xi’s people
    • Spy kids
    • Pink and imperilled
  • June
    • Herding mentality
    • Gay across the straits
    • Going its own way
    • Soil pollution in China: Buried poison
    • Pollution in China: The bad earth
    • Chinese politics: Xi’s nerve centre
    • Media: All that’s fit to print
    • Banyan: Still shy of the world stage
    • Chinese companies’ weak record on foreign deals
    • China’s crushing of independent lawyers is a blow to rule of law
    • China persuades Panama to break diplomatic ties with Taiwan
    • Australia and China: Meddle kingdom
    • Lawyers: Rights and wrongs
    • History: A not-so-golden age
    • Anbang: Out with an Anbang
    • Trade policy: Testing Trump’s metal
    • One country in Asia has embraced same-sex marriage. Where’s next?
    • Politics in Hong Kong: Still on borrowed time
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  • China has been poorer than Europe longer than the party thinks
  • How will this affect Xi’s ”Chinese dream”?

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  1. June

History: A not-so-golden age

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Last updated 6 years ago

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China has been poorer than Europe longer than the party thinks

How will this affect Xi’s ”Chinese dream”?

Jun 15th 2017 | BEIJING

XI JINPING, China’s president, likes to talk of his “Chinese dream”. He says it involves “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. To him this means that under the Communist Party, China will again be the world’s richest, most powerful country as it was before the “hundred years of humiliation”—the economic disasters and territorial grabs by foreigners during the century after the first opium war of 1839-42. By extension the party’s legitimacy will rest on this rejuvenation. But what if China was not the world’s richest country before 1839? What if it has lagged behind Europe not for 175 years but for 675? Would Mr Xi’s Chinese dream be so compelling?

A new study by Stephen Broadberry of Oxford University, Hanhui Guan of Peking University and David Daokui Li of Tsinghua University in Beijing argues that China has indeed lagged behind Europe for centuries. It compares levels of GDP per person in China, England, Holland, Italy and Japan since around the year 1000. It finds the only period when China was richer than the others was during the 11th century. By that time China had invented gunpowder, the compass, movable type, paper money and the blast furnace.

But according to Mr Broadberry and his co-authors, Italy had caught up with China before 1300, and Holland and England by 1400. Around 1800 Japan overtook China as the richest Asian country. Chinese GDP per person fell relentlessly during the Qing dynasty (1644-1912). In 1620, it was roughly the same as it had been in 980. By 1840, it had fallen by almost a third (see chart).

These findings challenge a hitherto common belief that China and Europe had similar living standards for centuries until the West’s industrial revolution began in the late 18th century: a point often referred to by historians as the “great divergence”. This view, promoted by Kenneth Pomeranz of the University of Chicago, lends more support to the party’s understanding.

Researchers used not to be able to work out GDP from 1,000 years ago. Angus Maddison, an economic historian, was among the first to try. But the research by Mr Broadberry and his colleagues, which scales up local and private records to generate national accounts, offers greater detail. The first study of Britain’s historical GDP using this technique appeared in 2008. It was followed quickly by other ones focusing on Holland, Italy and now on China.

Doubts remain about the quality of the Chinese data. A recent study by Kent Deng and Patrick O’Brien of the London School of Economics argues they are too fragmentary. It is hard enough comparing the living standards of different countries today, let alone doing so in the distant past with far less precise statistics. Mr Broadberry responds that China’s historical sources are no worse than those available for medieval England. He also notes that imperial China and early-modern Europe both used silver as a unit of value, facilitating comparison.

But there remains a vital difference of scale. Italy and the Holland were the richest parts of Europe in the 14th and 15th centuries. It might be better to compare them not with China as a whole but with its richest part, the Yangzi delta, around modern-day Shanghai. If you do that, England and Holland were still richer than the Yangzi area in 1800 but the point at which they overtook the delta turns out to be around 1700. This is not so different from Mr Pomeranz’s view that the great divergence happened in the 18th century. But it still means the process had begun before the industrial revolution, which in turn implies that European wealth and Chinese poverty cannot be explained by industrialisation: they must reflect institutional differences.

Mr Xi would do better to consider a different source of legitimacy from history: poverty reduction. If Mr Broadberry and his co-authors are right, Chinese peasants saw almost 1,000 years of decline and misery after 1000. But Mr Xi’s party has massively reduced rural poverty and hopes to eradicate it by 2020. That is an achievable dream.